Miscommunication – an Example
"Misunderstandings and inertia perhaps cause more errors in the world than deliberate slyness and mischief".
Such were the words of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in his 1774 Briefroman “The Sorrows of Young Werther”, and while the context was then a romantic drama, the point also applies to other arenas of life. Misunderstandings are everyday occurrences, and I think they are overlooked and ignored as an object within all fields of activity – academia, politics, business, and military. In military applications, battles are lost when communication goes awry. Let's find out how misunderstandings occur.
The 1988 USS Vincennes tragedy
Correct intel is crucial to a positive mission outcome, and misinterpretations can result in fatal consequences. By example I will look at the disastrous events in the Strait of Hormuz in July 1988 when a civilian airliner was shot down by surface-to-air missiles fired from the American missile cruiser USS Vincennes, presumably by error. I shall also present possible solutions as to how we may avoid such instances, that not only be in military applications, but moreover in business, academia, journalism and other arenas of activity.
Two SM-2MR missiles struck the civilian flight Iran Air Flight 655 (Airbus A300), leading to a fatal crash, killing everyone aboard. The airplane was no threat, and operating nominally and in line with aviation regulations, so why was the fire order given aboard USS Vincennes? Let’s look at what happened in the Strait of Hormuz – a series of events which lasted mere minutes before ending in disaster.
USS Vincennes in June, 1986.
On the morning of July 3rd, 1988
During Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, U.S. Navy warships were on a security mission in the Arabian Gulf to protect civilian merchant ships from anticipated attacks by Iranian warships. A misunderstanding led to a missile strike on a civilian airliner crossing the ocean.
Left, an Iranian postage stamp depicting the tragic incident.
Events leading to the incident
On the morning of July 3rd 1988, two U.S. warships – USS Vincennes and Elmer Montgomery – had in the Arabian Gulf detected three Iranian gun boats advancing toward first a Danish civilian merchant vessel (Karama Maersk) and then shortly after, a Pakistani civilian merchant vessel.
After receiving intelligence about the threat against the civilian merchant ships, the two American warships at once prioritised the situation and advanced toward the three gun boats in the waters off the coast of Iran. A fast attack helicopter from aboard USS Vincennes was in advance sent toward the gun boats. Upon the helicopter arriving, it was targeted by small-arms fire from the gun boats, but was not hit critically. The two war ships, upon hearing the news of the helicopter getting shot at, was now advancing full speed toward the scene. And in doing so, crossing into Iranian territorial waters despite standing orders against this from U.S. high command.
When USS Vincenne arrived at the scene, it registered the gun boats “commencing an attack” (Naval History and Heritage Command), and USS Vincennes fired almost 100 cannon rounds toward the gun ships, with some fire returned by small-arms. Two gunship were promptly sunk, and another damaged. This incident, while tragic and important in itself, is not the centre of this story. The incident is, however, what led to the following events.
Iran Air Flight 655 taking off from Bandar Abbas
Before the incident with the gun boats took place, the civilian aircraft of Iran Air flight 655 took off from Bandar Abbas, heading for Dubai. Aboard the aircraft, mostly Iranian civilians (and various other nationalities) on their way to Dubai. The published flight route of this aircraft was planned directly above the scene of the sudden naval battle, unbeknownst to the first pilot of the civilian aircraft, and also initially unbeknownst to the commanding officers of the two U.S. war ships on the scene.
USS Vincennes was equipped with an at the time very advanced radar system called the Aegis Combat System. The system promptly detected an aircraft taking off from Bandar Abbas, Iran – which was perceived to be a combined civilian and military application airport. The detection of any aircraft in the surrounding airspace was normal and expected. The aircraft was upon detection mere minutes of flight time from the battle scene in the waters in the Strait of Hormuz.
The crew aboard USS Vincennes concluded the aircraft was a military F-14, and therefore an immediate threat. This would later prove to be a false designation.
Interpreting data from the Aegis Combat System
Meanwhile, the Aegis Combat System aboard USS Vincennes classified the approaching aircraft as a so-called Mode III (civilian) airliner. This designation was given on basis of the airliner’s IFF-transponder, which was set to that mode. Despite this information, the anti-air warfare coordinator aboard USS Vincennes gave the aircraft a mode II (military) classification. According to Naval History and Heritage Command, the anti-air warfare coordinator gave the aircraft the military classification and not the civilian one because “Iranian military aircraft were known to transmit both Mode II and Mode III IFF.” (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Above, Strait of Hormuz, where the incident took place.
The anti-air warfare coordinator aboard did however cross-reference the detected aircraft with published flight schedules in the area, and found no civilian aircraft flight scheduled to be on the observed coordinates at that specific time. This cross-reference yielded no results because Iran Air Flight 655 was 27 minutes late compared to its published flight plan.
The military designation given by the anti-air warfare coordinator would later prove to be false, but was given as such “partly due to “darkness” in “CIC” (the Combat Information Center), a time-zone change between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, and that Flight 655 was late”. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Therefore, the captain of USS Vincennes was briefed that an Iranian F-14 was heading toward USS Vincennes. The direct quote from Naval History and Heritage Command reads:
“Rogers (the captain) received a report that an Iranian F-14 had taken off from Bandar Abbas and was on a course toward Vincennes”.
USS Sides
Because of these highly important news, another nearby U.S. warship, the USS Sides, was also briefed that an Iranian F-14 was incoming. However, the commander of USS Sides followed procedure via his own CIC (command information center) to confirm the reports of an alleged incoming military F-14, and found no indication of this, but instead deemed the aircraft civilian.
Here’s an interesting fact – the CIC (the Combat Information Center) aboard USS Sides painted the unknown aircraft with its on-board missile radar – an action which would immediately prompt a warning in the radar warning receiver on the aircraft itself – had it been a military aircraft! USS Sides saw no response or reaction from this radar painting attempt, but instead noted that the aircraft continued its steady climb.
However, the commander of USS Sides did not communicate his contradictory assessment to USS Vincennes. He knew USS Vincennes had the more advanced Aegis Combat System, and therefore deemed the data output from this system more accurate than his own. This non-communication is noteworthy, and will later prove to be a key component in the conclusion of this story.
A military threat or a harmless, civilian airliner? A question of massive importance!
USS Vincennes gave the approaching aircraft verbal warnings via a designated radio distress channel which should have been picked up by the airliner, but these call were never answered. We don’t know why the warning messages were never answered, nor do we know whether they were received or not. The aircraft had only been airborne for a few minutes at the time, so pilots would on that leg of the flight be expected to be engaged in various operations with controlling the fast ascent. None the less, radio warnings should be able to come through at all times during the flight.
With an assumed hostile aircraft rapidly approaching, the commander of USS Vincennes gave orders to fire two missiles toward the aircraft. The aircraft was hit by both missiles, and crashed into the ocean, killing all civilians aboard.
Key takeaways
There are more details about this incident, from various sources, which could provide different nuances and angles to the story. I have deliberately only followed an account written by the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, and the full report can be read here. I cannot verify the validity of claims made by the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, but their story may serve as one data point in your own continued research on the topic should you be interested. I recommend reading another account of the incident written by U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, which can be found here.
My point is not necessarily to uncover any definitive truths, but merely highlight a few key components of the incident which has to do with the communications aspect of the tragedy.
We learned that:
officers in the CIC (Combat Information Center) aboard USS Vincennes ignored data output from the Aegis Combat System that the aircraft was civilian and not military. This was allegedly because Iranian military aircraft “were known” to use the civilian designation in their transponder
the captain aboard the accompanying warship, USS Sides, concluded the aircraft was civilian, but did not communicate this finding to USS Vincennes because the commander understood the Aegis radar system aboard USS Vincennes to be more accurate, and therefore more able to produce a more valid assessment than himself
had the captain of USS Vincennes trusted his own systems 100 % and accepted the civilian designation of the aircraft, the missiles would not have left the ship. Instead, he drew upon his own and his crew’s knowledge of the battlefield that Iranian military aircraft would sometimes use a civilian designation as a way of camouflaging intent. This informal knowledge have potentially saved him and his men in other situations, but it was not relevant in this particular instance
you cannot trust computers alone, because adversaries will find ways to trick and alter the output of systems which have a predictable outcome
human intuition and combat knowledge is vital on the battlefield, but such knowledge should be paired with all other relevant data, even if repetitive, to maximise the chance of determining the level of threat on the battlefield.
In a final concluding remark, I do not necessarily condone nor blame the actions performed by the crew aboard USS Vincennes. It’s blatantly clear that the fire order was an error in itself, and shouldn’t have been given. However, understanding what information the crew and the captain were operating with, given the time pressure (the incident played out in mere minutes), and with the overall circumstance taken into account, the picture becomes anything else than simple.
Therefore, as a purely hermeneutical exercise, I do not necessarily believe blame should be assigned to a single individual, even if the captain, since the incident involved several actors, a reliance on electronic combat systems, a reliance on formalised procedures, and perceived deviations from the standard picture.
Sources
Account of the incident by the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command: https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-020/h-020-1-uss-vincennes-tragedy--.html
Goethe quote: From Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s 1774 Briefroman “Die Leiden des jungen Werthers”. Original quote: “Mißverständnisse und Trägheit vielleicht mehr Irrungen in der Welt machen als List und Bosheit“
Images
Combat Information Center aboard USS Vincennes: Credit to the U.S. Navy under the U.S. Federal Government. Public domain in the United States. Via wikimedia.org
USS Vincennes (CG-49), June 1986: Naval History & Heritage Command Photo Section, Photo #NH 106519-KN. Use of released U.S. Navy imagery does not constitute product or organizational endorsement of any kind by the U.S. Navy